Goma has fallen… What’s next? Sanctioning Rwanda or the M23 won’t work.
The outside world is finally waking up now that the M23 rebels have taken Goma. They will most likely take Kavumu (the airport of Bukavu, in South Kivu) very soon, denying their enemies access to a stronghold from which they could launch a counteroffensive. The same applies to the northern frontline near Lubero, where the FARDC coalition might also attempt a counterattack.
With the stabilization of Goma, the M23 has withdrawn a significant number of its soldiers to localities such as Rwindi, Bambo, and Rutshuru to support their ongoing offensive in South Kivu and consolidate their hold on Goma. However, they have maintained enough forces on the northern frontline.
In and around Goma, their victory is nearly complete: the FARDC was pushed out in no time, the FDLR suffered heavy losses—losing more than half of its fighters—the mercenary force was surrounded and openly humiliated in front of the world press, and the SADF forces might be next in line to suffer the same fate, risking a complete loss of credibility in this conflict. Meanwhile, the UN was confronted with the consequences of its own shortcomings.
Euphoria within M23 ranks is at an all-time high, and perhaps they have reason to celebrate. But what comes next?
We spoke with key players, Congo analysts, and sources on the ground to compare the current situation with past events. Several possible scenarios remain.
Possible sanctions
The likelihood of Rwanda being sanctioned for its alleged “support” of the M23 is now higher than ever. However, based on what we are hearing, such measures will have no immediate impact. The current situation is not comparable to 2013. The Tutsi community in the DRC feels betrayed by the international community, as the agreements they made with Kinshasa’s leadership were never upheld.
Despite repeated defeats, President Tshisekedi refused to negotiate with the M23, insisting that only talks with the Rwandan government would reinforce his claim that the M23 is almost entirely a Rwandan force. In response, President Kagame, seemingly frustrated with this narrative, sent a representative to the negotiating table.
For Congolese Tutsis, this is their last chance to reclaim their civil rights and lost properties in the DRC. They are determined to stand their ground, ensuring that any counterattack against them becomes a logistical nightmare. They may also begin using profits from the mineral trade in the DRC to offset their financial losses.
It is our opinion and conviction that sanctions will only add fuel to the fire, potentially pushing the M23 to pull the Kivu's even further out of the DRC’s control. The involvement of the Rwandan army is far less extensive than what UN expert reports suggest. These reports—along with analysts such as Jason Stearns, who has not set foot in the region for years—downplay the threat posed by the FDLR and the fact that the FARDC has absorbed numerous other criminal groups.
They ignore the reality that the FDLR was once again planning to infiltrate Rwanda and that Hutu extremists in Europe were persuading young Hutus in Rwanda to join the FDLR in Congo through the so-called "Checheka network"—a reference to their deceptive smiles, which mask their true intentions.
In their narratives, the only bogeyman is Rwanda. By doing so, they reinforce the biased perspective promoted by the Kinshasa government.
Congolese government checkmate
Patrick Muyaya’s propaganda machine is now struggling to mobilize the Congolese population against the so-called "Tutsi devils." Even before the fall of Goma, most Congo watchers and analysts had already concluded that President Félix Tshisekedi would have to step down in favor of a more pragmatic successor to resolve the crisis with the M23 rebels. Instead of pointing fingers at Rwanda, the international community should have focused on urging Kinshasa’s leadership toward a more moderate and cooperative approach. However, the United Nations (UN) chose to support the FARDC, even as it integrated groups like the FDLR, Nyatura, and CODECO—criminal militias with a history of atrocities. This integration allowed anti-Rwanda lobbies to frame M23 as the primary aggressor while ignoring Kinshasa’s dangerous alliances.
Moreover, the Congolese government brought in mercenaries, many of whom are now retreating from Rwanda in disgrace. The role of the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) must be reassessed, and its expert reports should be scrutinized with greater objectivity. Throughout the conflict, the M23 repeatedly called for negotiations, while Rwanda maintained that Tshisekedi should engage directly with the rebels rather than scapegoating Kigali. Had this advice been heeded, Goma might still be under FARDC control, and countless internally displaced people (IDPs) could have remained in their villages. Blaming Rwanda and M23 for the crisis is not only hypocritical but factually incorrect.
The fall of Goma underscores the complete failure of the Kinshasa regime. However, Tshisekedi’s potential successors offer little hope—most are equally corrupt and unreliable. A change in leadership might temporarily ease tensions in the Kivus, but it will not extract the DRC from its political and economic quagmire. The international community, which has long benefited from the status quo, continues to enable this dysfunction, ensuring that the Congolese people remain impoverished and underdeveloped.
The real challenge begins for M23
Despite their military success, M23’s real test begins now. They must convince the international community of their credibility, enhance transparency, establish an inclusive local administration, and negotiate a lasting peace with whoever assumes power in Kinshasa. When this rebellion began three years ago, M23 had only a handful of seasoned politicians, such as Bertrand Bisimwa. Their initial struggle was one of self-defense against the FARDC, but as their territorial control expanded, the need for a more structured political wing and professional media strategy became clear.
Patrick Muyaya persistently pressured both foreign and Congolese media not to engage with what he labeled as "terrorists." Journalists who defied this directive risked becoming persona non grata in the rest of the country. In response, M23 formed the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), a political extension led by Corneille Nangaa. However, Nangaa’s past is controversial—he was instrumental in installing Tshisekedi as president and later fled Kinshasa under a cloud of corruption allegations. Initially shielded from international scrutiny, Nangaa has now emerged as a central figure, publicly declaring his intent to "liberate" the entire country.
Prior to the AFC’s involvement, M23 recruited young fighters primarily to secure the Kivus, ensuring safe repatriation for refugees in neighboring countries. Their alliance with the AFC helped counter claims that they were a Rwandan proxy. While Rwanda was not involved at the outset, it had little choice but to act once Tshisekedi began incorporating the FDLR into the FARDC as cannon fodder. Our field research at the border confirmed that the FDLR was actively recruiting young Rwandans and coercing locals into providing intelligence on RDF movements.
M23 and the Tutsi identity in the DRC
M23 has long been accused of being a Rwandan proxy, largely due to linguistic and cultural similarities between the Congolese Bagogwe Tutsi and the Rwandan Tutsi. Many Congolese Tutsi soldiers who previously served in the RDF returned to their homeland, further fueling this perception. The international community conveniently framed this as evidence of Rwanda’s involvement, ignoring the historical and ethnic realities of the region.
Now, M23 is forging alliances with the Banyamulenge community in South Kivu. Historically, the Banyamulenge lived separately from other Tutsi clans in Rwanda and Burundi, often collaborating with the Congolese government. However, as they too became targets of Kinshasa’s anti-Tutsi rhetoric, a renewed alliance with the Bagogwe and M23 emerged. The average Congolese citizen, lacking accurate historical knowledge, remains susceptible to anti-Tutsi propaganda.
Meanwhile, the UN and human rights organizations continue to downplay Tshisekedi’s alliance with Burundian President Évariste Ndayishimiye, a Hutu extremist whose Imbonerakure militia shares ideological roots with the Interahamwe and FDLR.
War of clichés
Another false narrative accuses M23 and Rwanda of seeking control over eastern Congo’s mineral wealth. It was Tshisekedi who leased key mining sites to the FDLR and Burundians in exchange for military support. Blocking these exploitative deals was a natural response for M23. Profits from these minerals were even used to finance the Rwandan Hutu political opposition and lobby groups in Europe.
Unlike other militias, M23 enforces strict discipline within its ranks—rape is not tolerated, child soldiers are not recruited, and illegal taxation at roadblocks is regulated.
The battle for Goma and beyond
The fall of Goma and the ongoing push toward Kavumu test M23’s strategic adaptability. Redeploying troops from the north has left some areas vulnerable, potentially inviting attacks from remnants of Nyatura, CODECO, and the FDLR. M23’s seizure of vast quantities of weapons in Goma has bolstered their military strength, but if they extend their campaign into South Kivu, their forces may become overstretched.
Whether M23 will advance further into Congo remains uncertain. While the Tutsi community may welcome territorial gains, expansion would necessitate extensive recruitment, diverting manpower from securing refugee returns. These refugees, upon reclaiming their stolen properties, will require robust security measures. Past experiences have taught the Tutsi community the high cost of fighting wars beyond their own territory. Many are unlikely to support Nangaa’s grand ambitions.
Political opportunism and the future of the DRC
If Goma is secured, it will likely attract Kinshasa’s political outcasts and fortune seekers eager for new opportunities. A similar phenomenon occurred with the AFDL rebellion, where Rwandan-backed forces struggled to install trusted leadership and ultimately had to rely on Laurent-Désiré Kabila—whom Che Guevara once described as an untrustworthy opportunist. Kabila quickly pursued his own interests, selling mining concessions to the highest bidders.
A similar dynamic emerged during the second Congo war within the ranks of Goma’s RCD. M23 will need to carefully vet political figures seeking to align with them, ensuring that their movement remains true to its objectives.
Most M23 leaders still believe in negotiations, even after securing both Kivu's. Their professional capture of Goma demonstrated military discipline and restraint. Their handling of the FARDC, South African Defense Force (SADF), and mercenary surrenders was notably effective. A potential battle for Kavumu airport could lead to further casualties, especially if FARDC and Burundian forces resist. The SADF, having collaborated with the FDLR, may find its presence in the Kivu’s untenable.
The South-African president is contradicting itself: by sending badly equipped troops into the DRC who started collaborating with the FDLR the presence of his army is becoming a hot potato. The SADF is surrounded in Goma and staying there will only result in more losses. The only way out for him is via Rwanda and he’s accusing the Rwandans of the loss of his soldiers. SADF already performed badly in Cabo del Gado where the RDF had to clean up their mess. The Goma debacle shows clearly that South-Africa lost most of its international prestige. For the Tutsi community the presence of the SADF in Congo is not longer wanted.
A reckoning for the international community
The international community must reassess its approach. The UN, human rights organizations, and Western policymakers have relied on distorted narratives to vilify M23 while excusing Kinshasa’s transgressions. The M23 rebellion is not about balkanizing the DRC but about securing the rights of a marginalized community.
If Kinshasa truly wishes to preserve national unity, it must adopt a more inclusive approach. The international community must facilitate this transition instead of perpetuating anti-Tutsi scapegoating. The Tutsi communities in the Great Lakes region will no longer tolerate false accusations or threats to their security.
The M23 has matured politically over the years. Now, it is up to them to prove it.
To be continued…
Adeline Umutoni & Marc Hoogsteyns, Kivu Press Agency